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Theoretical Insights and Policy Prospects  
Summary 
This paper takes sustainability to be a matter of intergenerational welfare equality and 
examines whether an optimal development path can also be sustainable. It argues that 
the general “zero-net-aggregate-investment” condition for an optimal development path 
to be sustainable in the sense of the maximin criterion of intergenerational justice is too 
demanding to be practical, especially in the context of developing countries. The 
maximin criterion of sustainability may be more appealing to the rich advanced 
industrial countries, but is too costly and ethically unreasonable for developing nations 
as it would act as an intergenerational “poverty equalizer”. The paper suggests that a 
compromise development policy that follows the optimal growth approach but adopts 
certain measures to mitigate the intergenerational and intragenerational welfare 
inequalities may better serve these countries. Some of the principal elements of such a 
policy are highlighted. 
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1. Introduction 
“Sustainability” has come into vogue, but remains a vague concept, making it hard 
to test sustainability in practice. Many economists define sustainability as was done in the 
report of the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987), the 
Bruntland Report.
1 It defines sustainable economic development as: “development that 
meets the needs of present generations without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs”.  Implicit in this definition are two basic concepts: 
Intergenerational fairness and optimality. Sustainability is a question of intergenerational 
equity, asking about the fair or just distribution of productive capacity and welfare between 
the present and future generations. Optimality, on the other hand, is concerned with 
attaining the highest feasible level of social welfare over the long run. We consider 
sustainability as a question of intergenerational equality in economic welfare, and focus on 
a basic question: Is there a conflict between sustainability and optimality?  Or, phrased 
differently: Can an optimal economic development path also be sustainable? 
We begin in section 2.1 by reviewing the main insights from the theory of optimal 
economic growth (Ramsey (1928)) and its extension to cases where a natural exhaustible 
resource is essential to production (Dasgupta and Heal (1974)(1979)). In section 2.2, we 
consider the extreme case of intergenerational justice as defined by Rawls’ maximin 
criterion and discuss its implications for economic sustainability in a simple model with a 
single consumption good, a reproducible man-made capital, and a natural exhaustible 
resource (Solow (1974) and Hartwick (1977)) and expand this in section 2.3 to a very 
general model which includes many consumption goods and services, many man-made 
capitals and environmental  stocks, and the direct effect of time (Farzin(2006)). Section 3 
highlights the limitations and practical difficulties with the implementation of sustainability 
rule as implied by the maximin criterion of intergenerational justice, emphasizing the 
important roles of scale, externalities, information, markets and other institutions in the 
                                                 
1 For a review of various definitions of sustainability see Pezzey (1989) and World Bank (1997). 
See also Farzin (2004) who uses two alternative definitions of sustainability to show that even a 
purely exhaustible resource economy can under certain conditions be sustainable by one of the 
sustainability definitions. 
  1design of a sustainability policy. In section 4, we argue that while the maximin rule of 
sustainability may offer a sensible approach for rich industrial economies, it turns into a 
“poverty equalizer” policy for poor developing nations. We suggest that a policy that 
adopts the optimal growth approach but modifies it to account for intergeneration 
inequality may offer a more practicable and promising alternative for developing countries. 
We outline some of the main elements of such a policy to promote the growth of future 
welfare and sustainability. Section 5 concludes.     
 
2.  Theoretical Insights 
 
2.1  Ramsey’s Utilitarian Approach 
The search for an economic development path that is both optimal and sustainable 
occupied economists as far back as Ramsey (1928). Ramsey sought an optimal path for the 
capital stock to converge to some positive level and remain permanently at that level (i.e., a 
steady-state level) regardless of the initial size of the capital stock. However, 
characterizing sustainability by the steady-state of the economy, as in Ramsey’s optimal 
growth model, has the problem that sustainability, if achievable at all, is attained only after 
the economy has reached its steady state. As such, it has no regard for intergenerational 
distribution of savings burden and consumption (welfare) in the transition period to the 
steady state, which may be a very long period, indeed.  
 To make the point clear and to form a basis for my subsequent arguments, let us 
briefly revisit Ramsey’s optimal growth model.  
Ramsey model is a utilitarian one in that the social planner adopts a utilitarian 
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( ):capital stock per head
( ( )):production technology
( ):consumption perhead
: social time discount rate (constant)
: population growth rate (constant)







The evolution of Ramsey’s economy along an optimal path is characterized by the pair of 
differential equations: 
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2.1.1 Some Important Sustainability Insights from Ramsey Model 
(a) No Discounting of Future Welfare 
Ramsey objected to the discounting of future utilities as “ethically indefensible”, 
and believed that it “arises merely from the weakness of imagination”. If we follow this 
moral principle, so that 0 ρ = , and for simplicity’s sake assume constant population and no 
capital stock depreciation, so that 0 n δ = = , then from (1.1) and (1.2) we have that 
        and  () ( () ) () 0 kt fkt ct =−  >() () ( () )/ 0 ct ct f kt η ′ = >   (2) 
That is, there exists no steady state: along the optimal development path capital stock and 
consumption per head, and hence welfare, rise over time right from the beginning without 
bound. So, each successive generation will be better off than its previous generation, with 
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Figure 1: Optimal consumption path in Ramsey model
no discounting, ρ=0 
 
Thus, we have the rather ironic result that:  
In a utilitarian society, following the moral principle of treating the welfare of all 
generations equally (i.e., applying no discount rate) could result in an optimal outcome 
which is intergenerationally highly inequitable! 
 
(b) Discounting of Future Welfare 
Koopmans (1967)(1970) was the first economist who questioned the reasonableness 
of the moral principle that requires the welfare of all generations to be equally treated in the 
social welfare function. He showed that such a principle would result in unacceptably large 
sacrifices to be made by the present generation in that it would impose an unacceptably 
high savings burden, leaving the present generation almost destitute. Arrow (1996) 
confirms this argument by way of a thought-experiment, showing that if the present 
generation is presented with a one-time only investment opportunity which provides a 
small constant income forever, then with no discounting, the optimal decision requires that 
the present generation to invest its entire income, i.e., it should have a savings rate equal to 
1. Interestingly, Arrow shows that the Koopmans’ basic argument does neither depend on 
uncertainty about the investment (although that uncertainty reinforces the argument) nor 
essentially on the assumption of an infinite time horizon by demonstrating that even if the 
time horizon of the investment is reduced from infinity to say 3000 years and the return to 
  4investment is assumed to be as low as 0.01% (one-hundredth of a percentage), without 
discounting of future returns, the optimality still dictates that the present generation should 
save and invest almost 90% of its income- too high a rate by any ethical standard (more on 
this point later on). 
So, how would the discounting of future generations’ welfare alter the above 
conclusion about the intergenerational inequality associated with the utilitarian approach? 
It is easy to verify from (1.1) and (1.2) that regardless of whether the population is constant 
or grows at a constant rate , and regardless of whether capital stock depreciates at a 
constant rate 
0 n >
0 δ > or not at all, there exists a steady-state for the economy. It is 
characterized by , where the constant consumption per head and capital per 
head are obtained as solutions to the pair of equations   
() () 0 kt ct ==  
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Assuming 0 kk < , the optimal policy will involve a transition period during which the 
consumption and capital per head rises over time until the economy reaches the steady 
state. Thereafter, for ever the consumption per head and hence welfare remains constant for 












Figure 2: Optimal consumption path in Ramsey model 
with discounting, ρ>0 
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  5Thus, in the utilitarian model, although discounting of future welfare defies the 
moral principle of treating the welfare of all generations equally, again rather ironically, 
it leads to an optimal outcome in which after certain initial period all future generations 
will enjoy an equal welfare level. However, the utilitarian economy still involves a 
transitional period during which intergenerational equity fails to prevail. This is because, 
as in the previous case, the earlier generations during this transitional period will be worse 
off than later generations who in turn will be less well off than those living in the steady 
state, with the present generation being the least well off of all.  
  The concept of capital stock in Ramey model was limited to a manufactured capital. 
As such, it ignored other types of capital stocks such as human capital, knowledge capital, 
social capital and in particular the important question of degradation and depletion of 
environmental and natural resource assets. This task was later taken by Dasgupta and Heal 
(1974) (1979) and Stiglitz (1974) who generalized the Ramey model to include an 
exhaustible natural resource stock. 
  Dasgupta and Heal showed that with no discounting of the future generations’   
welfare ( 0 ρ = ), and maintaining the assumptions of constant population, constant 
technology, and no capital depreciation, the inclusion of the exhaustible resource makes no 
difference to the conclusion reached in the Ramsey model: Along the optimal path (when it 
exists)
2, consumption, and hence utility, per head rises over time without bound and the 
exhaustible resource is used at rates that declines to zero as time approaches infinity. Thus, 
as in the Ramsey model without the natural resource stock, the optimal development path is 
at odds with intergenerational equality in consumption and welfare. Interestingly, however, 
the optimal path does imply a constant savings ratio, so it is intergenerationally equitable in 
the sense of equal savings burden.   
  Noteworthy in the utilitarian model is the role of the ethically based parameter η , 
which indicates the degree to which social preferences are egalitarian, or stating it 
differently, the degree of society’s aversion to intergenerational welfare inequality. Not 
                                                 
2 With a Cobb-Douglas production technology, (,) QFK R KR α β == where  K is the reproducible 












, 0 η> , the optimal policy exists if   (1 )/( ) η βα β >− − (see Slow (1974)). 
  6surprisingly, the larger is η  the flatter becomes the optimal path of consumption per head, 
implying a reduction in the degree of intergenerational inequality relative to a constant 
consumption path.  In fact, in the extreme case when η →∞ the optimal path of 
consumption per head becomes a constant path, implying intergenerational equality in 
consumption (see Figure 3). 




c(t)→c ⎯       ;   η→∞ 
c0,2




Figure 3: The Role of η in the utilitarian (Ramsey) model 
with no discounting (ρ=0)
 
In contrast with the case of no discounting, when future welfare is discounted 
( 0 ρ > ), then along the utilitarian optimal path, consumption eventually declines to zero 
(i.e., the economy collapses in the very long-run). However, depending on the magnitude 
of the discount rate the path to eventual collapse differs. For very low discount rates, 
consumption per head first rises over time and reaches a peak and then monotonically falls 
over time and eventually becomes zero.  On the other hand, for large discount rates, 
consumption will monotonically fall to zero. The role of discount rate is just the opposite of 
that of η , so that a smaller discount rate reduces the intergenerational inequality relative to 
the perfectly equal distribution (see Figure 4).     
  7        
  In summary, if the concept of sustainability is taken to mean a development policy 
that is intergenerationally just in the sense that it provides the same consumption (welfare) 
per head to the present and all future generations, then in general the utilitarian economy 
falls short of being sustainable, whether or not future welfare is discounted.  
           c(t); 0< ρ1΄< ρ1
c(t); ρ1 >0 Small 






Figure 4: The utilitarian consumption path with 
exhaustible resource and discounting(ρ>0) 
  
2.2  Maximin Rule of Intergenerational Justice  
The concern about intergenerational justice on the one hand and depletion of natural 
and environmental assets, on the other, confronts us with a basic question: If instead of 
adopting the utilitarian approach one were to adopt sustainability (or intergenerational 
equality) as the social objective, would an economy that is endowed with both 
manufactured capital and an essential exhaustible resource stock be able to achieve the 
sustainability objective in an optimal fashion?    
Fortunately, this is exactly the question that was first tackled and elegantly 
answered by Solow (1974) and Hartwick (1997), leading to what’s known as Solow-
Hartwick’s rule of sustainability. In its extreme form, intergenerational justice according to 
the Rawls’ (1971) moral philosophy of choosing from the “initial position” and “behind the 
veil of ignorance” implies the “maximin” social welfare function. That is, the society’s 
objective should be to maximize the well-being of the poorest generation among the 
present and all future generations.  By implication, sustainability then requires that 
  8consumption per head to remain permanently constant over time. The optimality of the 
sustainable development then entails selecting the largest permanently constant 
consumption per capita path that is feasible, given the initial endowments of the resource 
stock and the manufactured capital stock. Under the assumptions of no technological 
change,  no population growth ( 0 n = ), and no depreciation of capital ( 0 δ = ), Solow 
(1974) and later on Hartwick (1997) strikingly showed that, provided that there is enough 
substitutability between the manufactured capital and the natural resource, it is quite 
possible to achieve the highest feasible level of consumption per head that remains 
permanently constant over time. To do so, it is sufficient that at every point in time the 
scarcity rent from the depletion of the exhaustible resource stock be invested in 
accumulation of the manufactured capital (Solow-Hartwick Sustainability Rule). This is 
indeed a striking and elegant theoretical result, and with some important implications for 
sustainability policy, as we shall see shortly. It is a striking result because it informs us 
that:  
● As long as the elasticity of substitution between the natural resource and 
manufactured capital is at least one, even with the constraint of an exhaustible resource that 
is essential to production, it is possible to achieve a constant consumption (utility) per head 
for ever. As such, one should not worry about diminishing stock of the resource, of course, 
as long as it is depleted optimally and is made up for by accumulating the man-made 
capital optimally. 
● Along the optimal path, the use of exhaustible resource declines over time, 
implying more use of it by successive early generations than by later generations. This in 
turn shows that sustainability (or intergenerational equality) in consumption (well-being) 
not only does not require intergenerational equality in allocation of the resource stock 
itself. In fact, it may well require what ecologically may be judged an inequitable 
distribution of the resource stock. The same is true for the stock of manufactured capital, 
but, of course, in the opposite direction.  
● The Solow-Hartwick rule of sustainability is an elegant theoretical result because 
it seems so simple: to sustain consumption per head at its highest feasible level all that is 
needed is to invest the rents from natural resource extraction in the reproducible capital.  In 
other words, all that is needed for sustainability is to keep the net aggregate investment 
  9equal to zero all the time. Note that although in physical terms different generations use the 
natural resource (and accumulate the reproducible capital) at different rates, in harmony 
with equality in consumption per head, there is a sense of justice in the rule of zero-net-
aggregate investment: each generation’s obligation to invest in the reproducible capital is 
equal to the value of the natural resource stock it has drawn down. The more it has drawn 
on the natural resource stock the more it has to invest in the man-made capital.  
It was noted above that the Rawls’ maximin criterion of intergenerational justice is 
an extreme one. This is best appreciated by noting that the maximum sustainable level of 
consumption per head implied by the maximin criterion depends directly and more 
crucially on the initial endowment of the manufactured capital stock than on that of the 
natural resource stock. But, this means that achieving the goal of intergenerational justice 
according to the maximin criterion can be very costly, particularly for the poor developing 
nations where the initial capital stock is relatively small, for it would imply perpetuating 
the poverty of the present generation for all future generations. In a sense, when the initial 
capital stock is too small this sustainability rule implies a policy of “equal sharing of 
poverty by all generations”.  The undesirable consequence of pursuing a puritanical moral 
principle such as the maximin criterion naturally raises one’s interest to contrast this 
outcome with the alternative possibility where tolerating some reasonable degree of 
intergenerational inequality- in the form of a little reduction in consumption (increased 
saving) by the present generation- allows to raise the welfare levels of all future 
generations. We shall return to this point later on. 
What is the relationship of the utilitarian optimal policy with the maximin 
sustainable policy?  As noted earlier, in the case of utilitarian optimal policy, as the degree 
of egalitarianism of social preferences η  increases, the optimal utilitarian path of 
consumption per head becomes flatter. Unsurprisingly, as η  approaches infinity the 
utilitarian optimal path coincides with the maximin path (see Figure 3 above)
3.   
 
 
                                                 
3 Also, see Farzin (2004) for a hypothetical comparison of the optimal sustainable policies for a rich 
industrial and a poor developing country using some estimates of the discount rate and η . 
 
  102.3  Generalization of the (Maximin) Sustainability Condition 
Before discussing the limitations and difficulties with policy application of the 
Solow-Hartwick sustainability rule, it would be helpful if we consider the rule in its most 
general form. In a recent paper, Farzin (2006) derives a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the sustainability of a constant consumption/utility path for a dynamically optimizing 
economy that is most generally characterized as follows: 
▪ The instantaneous utility (well-being) function takes the most general form of 
, where   is a vector of n final consumption goods/services: 
, and   is a vector of m state variables, , 
representing the stocks of various types of renewable and non-renewable natural and 
environmental assets as well as human-made reproducible capital stocks (including 
human, knowledge capital, etc.).  Possible changes in social preferences over time is 
captured by the direct dependence of the utility function on time, t.  
(( ) ,( ) ,) ut t t cs ( ) t c
( ), 1,2,..., i ct i n = () t s ( ), 1,2,..., j st j m =
▪  The dynamics of the stocks are governed by the differential equations: 
. These indicate how various types of capital 
stocks change over time, and can include the growth functions of renewable resources 
(human population, fisheries, forests, ground water, soil fertility, environmental degradation, etc.), 
accumulation of reproducible capitals, depletion of exhaustible resource stocks, and possible 
interactions and interdependencies between dynamics of various types of stocks.  
( ( ), ( ), ), 1,2,..., jj sg tt t j m == cs 
( ) j st
  Obviously, a dynamic economy characterized as above is general enough to present 
almost any case that one may in practice be interested to study.  For example, it includes 
cases where the utility derives not only from consumptions of final goods and services to 
which natural and environmental resources provide inputs, but also from capital stocks 
themselves. Examples of the latter are the direct amenity and ecological values of 
environmental and natural resource stocks such as forests which are valued not only for 
providing timber but also for their recreational, carbon sequestering, flood controlling, 
water purifying, soil preservation, biodiversity preserving and other services. The system of 
m differential equations   is also general enough to allow 
for interdependencies of various stocks on one another; for example, those of fossil fuels 
and carbon stocks, or of forest and biodiversity stocks, or of human population and the 
( ( ), ( ), ), 1,2,..., jj sg tt t j m == cs 
  11stocks of natural and man-made capitals. The explicit dependence on time,  , includes 
cases where in the context of a single economy or region there is an exogenous flow of 
population growth, technological change, or positive or negative externalities over time 
such as knowledge spillover or transboundry or global pollutions, and so on. 
t
  ▪ Following Farzin (2006), one can seek the condition for an optimal sustainable utility 
path (when it exists) in two stages: first, by adopting the usual utilitarian approach to 
optimize a general utilitarian social welfare function  , and, 
second, obtain the condition under which this optimal path is constant over time.
0 (( ) ,( ) ,)
t Ve u t t t
ρ ∞ − =∫ cs d t
t
t
                                                
4  Thus, in 
the first stage, one can imagine that the social planner solves the following optimal control 
problem 
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Let  be the solution to this problem, where  is the vector of  
** * () , () , () tt t csλ
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co-state variables (shadow prices/costs associated with capital stocks). Then the current-
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In the second stage, one can resort to Weitzman’s (1976) seminal result that the 
maximized current-value Hamiltonian, , is the “stationary equivalent” of the utilitarian 
optimal welfare path, i.e. 
     (4) 
( ) Ht
() () * ( ) ( ( )) for all  0
tt
tt eH t d eu c d t
ρτ ρτ ττ τ
∞∞ −− −− =≥ ∫∫
In other words, it is the highest hypothetical constant utility path [ ] that has 
the same present discounted value as the actual utilitarian (and most likely non-constant) 
optimal path  . 
() } () t HH τ
∞ =
* (( ) ) } t uc τ
∞
Using this result, Farzin (2006) has shown that:  
 
4  Note that this straightforward and general optimal control method is in sharp contrast to the unusual and 
rather cumbersome optimization method adopted by Slow (1974).     
  12A necessary and sufficient condition for permanently sustaining the highest constant   
utility/consumption path(i.e., the maximin path) is that the maximized current-value 
Hamiltonian remains constant over time, i.e. that  () 0 , 0
d
Ht f o ra l lt
dt
= ≥ . 
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∂∂ ∂ ∑  measures the net change in the optimal current-value 
Hamiltonian at time t due purely to passage of time alone.  We may term this as net “pure 
time effect”, which may be positive (for example in the case of exogenous technological 
progress alone, or improvements in terms of trade, or an exogenous flow of foreign aid, and 
so on) or negative (for example when there is exogenous population growth or the rate of 
decay of carbon stock in the atmosphere, or exogenous transboundry pollution flow).  
Now if for simplicity we heuristically assume away any direct and exogenous effects of 
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all  , then the general maximin sustainability condition simplifies to  0 t ≥
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But, interestingly, this is none but the generalized version of the Solow-Hartwick’s 
sustainability rule when the Rawlsian criterion of intergenerational justice, i.e., the 
maximin criterion is adopted. It shows that the zero-net-aggregate-investment condition 
holds more generally when (1) there are many types of both natural and man-made capital 
stocks, (2) the well-being depends not only on a vector of final consumption goods and 








0 ) ≥ regardless of whether future welfare is discounted or not. The 
condition requires that at every point in time the net aggregate investment be zero. To fix 
the idea, let us for the sake of illustration take our capital stocks to be those of a natural 
resource, , a manufactured capital,  , a human capital,  , a knowledge  ( ) R St ( ) K St ( ) H St
  13capital,  , and a stock of pollution (say CO ( ) N St 2),  . If we denote the shadow price 
(cost) of these stocks at time t, respectively by 
( ) p St
() , () , () , () ,  a n d   () RKHN p tttt t λ λλλ λ , then 
the sustainability condition that   
() () () () () () () () () () 0 , 0 RR KK HH NN pp tS t tS t tS t tS t tS t a l l t λλλ λλ +++−=  ≥  (7) 
is akin to a rule of optimal portfolio management: the value of changes (whether positive or 
negative) in any one or more stocks needs to be made up for by changes in one or more 
other stocks such that the net value of the changes (the net aggregate investment) is always 
zero. This then guarantees the maximum constant consumption for all the present and 
future generations, where the level of this maximum consumption depends on the initial 
endowments of all of the capital stocks, positively in the case of the first four stocks and 
negatively for the pollution stock. This is a rich theoretical insight, for it informs us that:  
•  The decline in one stock, for example, depletion of a natural resource, should not 
necessarily alarm us that the economy is on an unsustainable path, as long as it is 
properly compensated by building up some other (either natural or man-made) stocks, 
for example by investing in human capital or in knowledge capital or in pollution 
abatement, or a combination of these.  In particular, we note that keeping the stocks of 
resources intact at their current levels ( ( ) 0 R St =  ,  0 () ( 0 ) RR St S S R = = ), or “leaving the 
nature as it is” (as is sometimes advocated by some environmental activists in advanced 
industrial countries) is neither necessary nor sufficient for sustainability. In fact, 
although keeping all capital stocks at their current levels (so that 
), or “ leaving the world as it is”,   
does trivially satisfy the sustainability condition, such a policy can lead to an 
inefficiently low consumption level for all generations, especially if the economy is 
currently poorly endowed with assets such as manufactured capital or human and 
knowledge capitals.  
() () () () () 0 , 0 RKHNP St St St St St a l l t ===== ≥ 
•  That there are some kinds of stocks (for example, environmental and natural resource 
assets) the depletion of which can not be made up for by accumulation of other types of 
stock is, of course, an undeniable fact. But, this  concern should worry us in as much as 
markets do not exist for their use or services or, if they exist, do not perform sufficiently 
  14well to reflect the lack of substitutability by commanding sufficiently high prices (in one 
form or the other reflecting their use value, amenity value, intrinsic value, or 
precautionary value, etc.) to ensure that either the resource is adequately conserved or 
that a substitute for it is developed and introduced. In the extreme case where a 
minimum critical (threshold) level of a resource stock ought to be preserved in order to 
sustain its regenerative capacity and flow of services (or in the opposite direction, if 
there is a ceiling on accumulation of a pollution stock beyond which damages inflicted 
are irreversible) and if there is no substitute for the resource, either in consumption or 
production, then in principle provided that the market for the resource exists and 
performs well its price would rise unboundedly as the critical threshold level of the 
stock is approached, thereby ensuring that the stock will never be depleted (or 
accumulated, in the case of pollution) to such a critical level.
5 Clearly, when in reality 
such markets do not exist or for variety of well known reasons fail to function as 
expected, the ecologists’ prescription of preserving natural and environmental assets 
above their critical levels (also sometimes known as the “strong” sustainability 
criterion) need to be heeded.  
 
3.  Sustainability Rule: The Practical Limitations and Challenges 
The rule of “zero-net-aggregate investment” provides some important and useful 
insights into sustainability of an intergenerationally equitable maximum consumption or 
utility level. However, in practice, the application of the condition faces several limitations, 
which in turn confront social scientists (including economists, political scientists and 
sociologists), natural scientists, engineers, and policymakers with serious challenges in 
their pursuit of sustainability.  Some of the most serious of these limitations and challenges 
are briefly discussed below:  
(i)    As we noted earlier, the rule requires that “capital stock” be treated in the broadest 
possible sense of the term. In other words, m in  1,2,..., jm = , must be as 
                                                 
5  Note that the optimality transversality condition for a resource stock ( j ) with a minimum 
threshold level takes the form of  j S

lim ( )[ ( ) ] 0 t et S t S jj j
t
ρ λ − − =
→∞ 
, and for a pollution stock with a 
ceiling constraint the sign of the terms in the bracket will be reversed. 
  15comprehensive as possible. However, in practice, it is extremely difficult to identify all 
the existing natural as well as man-made capital assets to include knowledge capital, 
human capital, social capital, and other types of capitals such as institutional capital, 
cultural heritages, and the like. More challenging are the tasks of measuring  their 
current stocks ( ) and recording changes in the stocks in every period ( ). 
Although some good progress has been made in this area by developing capital 
accounts for some of the main renewable and non-renewable assets, the tasks of 
measuring human capital (including skills, education, and health), knowledge capital 
(inventions and innovations), and social capital are in their infancy stage or barely 
undertaken in developing nations. 
() j So () j St 
(ii)    Even more challenging is the task of developing a reliable knowledge of the 
evolution of natural and environmental capitals, their dynamic interdependences, and 
the production processes by which they render positive or negative flows of inputs and 
services essential to sustain our well being. These are probably mainly the tasks of 
natural scientists who should inform economists and other social scientists of the very 
ecological capacities and constraints that need to be taken into account as important 
subsets of natural and technological constraints ( ( ( ), ( ), ), 1,2,..., = = jj sg tt t j m cs ) in 
development planning. 
(iii)    Another difficulty in applying the sustainability rule is the task of economic 
evaluation of the identified stocks. As the rule requires, all of the stocks should be 
evaluated at their shadow prices (rents in the case of exhaustible resources). However, 
for many of the capital stocks, particularly natural resources and environmental assets, 
either there are no markets, or if they exist, they are highly distorted by imperfect 
competition, imperfect information, or public policy interventions (especially subsidies 
on energy, water, and land). Many of natural and environmental resource and services 
currently lack markets, particularly in developing nations, either because of lack of 
recognized property rights, or deficiencies in monitoring and enforcing the rights 
(whether or not these rights are public, private, or communal (see Ostrom and Nagendra 
(2007) among many others).  Even when markets exist, they are not sufficiently 
competitive, due to lack of free entry (as in the cases of energy, water, and land) or 
  16because of imperfect information (resulting in asymmetric information and moral 
hazard problems), thus entangling prices with the rents arising from both imperfections 
of competition and of information.  
(iv)    Furthermore, by definition, the shadow prices to be used for valuation of changes in 
capital stocks include the social costs (benefits) of utilizing the stocks, As such, they 
diverge from market prices which fail to reflect social costs (benefits) of flow and stock 
externalities.   
(v)  Externalities  and  Sustainability: The problem of externalities and how they relate to 
sustainability is an important one and goes beyond using right prices for economic 
valuation of changes in capital stocks. The problem of externalities gives rise to two 
additional and intertwined issues for application of a sustainability rule. One issue is the 
common misunderstanding that the use of technologies or adopting practices that 
mitigate negative externalities (such as environmental pollutions) is equivalent to 
practice of sustainability: thus, for example agriculturalists frequently refer to organic 
methods of production (as against conventional methods) as “sustainable agriculture”. 
Similarly, corporations sometimes refer to the so called “green technologies”- that is, 
the production technologies that mitigate some form of pollution- as “sustainable 
industry”. However, by mitigating pollution emissions, such alternative agricultural 
practices or manufacturing technologies reduce inefficiencies of resource allocation, 
and hence increase the aggregate output. This is certainly desirable from efficiency 
point of view, but need not necessarily promote sustainability in the sense of 
intergenerational equality in welfare. As Bond and Farzin (2007a, 2007b) show in a 
simple two-sector dynamic model of an agricultural production and a consumer sector 
that is adversely affected by the agricultural run-offs, agricultural sustainability, 
although may involve less use of fertilizers and hence agricultural run-offs, it can well 
lead to more welfare inequalities both within and between generations.   
(vi)    Scale and Sustainability: This brings us to another related question: What is the 
appropriate scale at which the sustainability rule should be implemented?  Nowadays, it 
is fashionable to talk about “agricultural sustainability”, “corporate sustainability”, 
“ecological sustainability”, and sustainability at many other sectoral and sub-sectoral 
levels. From the perspective of a single closed economy, the sustainability rule of zero-
  17net-aggregate investment applies at the economy wide (macro economic) level, and this 
is the right scale for policy purposes. The reason is that not only the economic 
sustainability rule has nothing to prescribe about sustainability at sectoral level, as its 
objective is the sustainability of consumption or well-being at the societal level, 
sustainability in one sector or the other, regardless of what sustainability definition is 
employed, is neither necessary nor sufficient for sustainability at the economy-wide 
level. In fact, insisting on sectoral sustainability, as defined for instance  by sustaining 
profits or the rate of return on investment, or market shares or share of GDP, or well-
being of people employed in one specific sector, be it agriculture, industry, or service 
sector, can inflict great efficiency losses on the economy as a whole. This is so because 
such sectoral constraints impede the efficient allocation of resources across the 
economy (see Bond and Farzin (2007a)(2007b)). In other words, given the interlinkages 
between various sectors, imposing a sustainability constraint on one sector can have 
adverse implications for sustainability of others. Now, this argument equally applies to 
the  geographical scale at which a sustainability policy is to be implemented.  In 
general, since there are ecological, biological, or economic, social, or political 
interdependencies between various ecological units (a lake, a watershed, a forest, and 
the like) or economic units (a village, a town, a region), limiting the implementation of 
a sustainability policy to a specific micro geographical or ecological or economic scale 
may well itself be unsustainable.  This argument suggests that a sustainability policy 
should take as broad a view of the scale of sustainability as is relevant and feasible. At 
the same time, it reveals the critical role of coordination in achieving sustainability. It 
therefore follows that when there are strong international transboundary 
interdependencies (as in the cases of some fisheries, lakes, rivers, forests, and the like) 
or global interdependencies (such as the case of global warming, endemics, and the 
like), limiting the scale of  sustainability to one’s own national boundaries may not 
prove effective, at least not in the long run. By implication, this argument draws 
attention to the need for developing international and global sustainability institutions 
with the principal objectives of coordinating and facilitating the sustainability policies 
among various nations involved.   
  18(vii)    Turning to the case of a non-autonomous economy, the condition for the optimal 
policy to be sustainable is even more stringent than for an autonomous economy. This 
is because one would require that not only the net aggregate investment to remain at 
zero but also that the net “pure time effect” to remain constant over time, an almost 
impossibility.  In fact, even in the simple non-autonomous case where the only direct 
dependence of the economy on time comes through a time-dependent social discount 
rate, the prospect for the sustainability of an optimal development path remains bleak. 
This is because even if the discount rate function satisfies the required condition of 
declining sufficiently slowly (see Farzin (2006))- as is, for example, the case with the 
well-known hyperbolic discount rate function, a declining discount rate renders the 
optimal policy time inconsistent (Strotz (1956)), thus calling either for a credible 
commitment to the optimal policy or, if such a commitment device does not exists, for 
additional policies to substitute for commitment. 
 
4.  Developing Countries: Maximin Rule of Sustainability vs. Optimal Growth  
As was noted above, the application of the policy of zero-net- aggregate investment 
implied by the maximin rule of intergenerational justice confronts serious difficulties. 
These problems are even more serious in the case of developing countries than for the rich, 
advanced industrial economies, thus casting doubt about suitability of a development 
policy based on the maximin rule of sustainability. This is because:  
First, developing countries are more plagued with the problems of missing or 
malfunctioning markets, absent or ill-defined and ill-enforced property rights, imperfect 
information, and market distorting public interventions, to name a few. Also, the “pure 
time effects” of the factors affecting the economy exogenously and directly with time, 
whether positive (as in the case of disembodied technological change or knowledge 
spillover) or negative (as in the case of worsening of the terms of trade, or negative 
externalities associated with climate change), are likely to be more prevalent and 
pronounced in developing countries than in advanced industrial ones.  
Second, more importantly, following the maximin rule of sustainability will be a 
particularly costly policy for developing countries. This is because, as noted above, the 
maximum consumption per head or per capita welfare level which is to be kept constant by 
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human capital, knowledge capital, and social capital (legal and political institutions and 
social networks, etc.). Yet, developing counties are currently very poor in such assets, 
being more dependent on environmental and natural capital for their well being. 
Accordingly, for a poor developing country the maximin rule of sustainability would 
amount to all of its generations sharing and perpetuating its present poverty; that is, it will 
be a “poverty equalizer”.  This is perhaps too high a price to pay for the sake of 
intergenerational justice, and therefore is itself ethically questionable.  
Finally, as Slow (1993) has aptly pointed out, there is something of an ethical 
paradox with sustainability as a matter of intergenerational equity in general and with its 
extreme form of the maximin rule in particular. That is, if one is concerned about inequality 
of welfare between the present and future generations, shouldn’t then one be also, at least 
equally, concerned about the inequality of welfare between today rich and poor, that is, 
about the intra-generetional equity? To be logically consistent in our moral values, we 
should. But then, this would call for increasing the consumption and welfare level of the 
currently poor by redistribution policies both within a nation and between the nations, 
which may in turn conflict with raising the current investment rate as required for the 
intergenerational welfare equality. The fact, however, is that today we tolerate a lot of 
poverty both at the national and international levels, which contradicts the very moral 
principle of seeking equality of welfare between generations; that is, the very principle of 
sustainability.  
As is often the case, the truth lies somewhere between the two extremes: the ideal 
of maximin rule of intergenerational equality on the one hand and the heavily discounted 
utilitarian social welfare function, which is heavily biased towards current generation’s 
welfare, on the other. A  desirable and more practical policy seems to be the one that uses 
the insights from both of the two extreme approaches analyzed above. For the developing 
countries particularly, this translates into a compromising policy which tolerates some 
reasonable degree of inequality, both intragenerationally as well as intergenerationally, for 
the sake of providing all future generations the welfare levels that can be well above that 
implied by the maximin rule.  
  20Drawing on the theoretical insights obtained from both approaches discussed above, 
we outline the main and broad elements of a policy which aims to promote the growth of 
future welfare while at the same time mitigates the intergenerational and intragenerational 
welfare inequalities, thereby promoting sustainability too. These elements are: 
(1)  In principle, the objectives of intertemporal optimality (or dynamic efficiency) 
and intergenerational equality (or sustainability) need not be inconsistent as long as the 
efficiency gains can be redistributed across the present and future generations to make all 
generations better off than they would be if the efficiency gains were to be sacrificed in 
return for attaining intergenerational equality (as would be the case, for example, with the 
maximin rule or if one were to allocate capital stocks equally (and hence sub-optimally) 
across generations.  The problem, however, is a lack of credible commitment devices 
whereby the optimality gains can actually be transferred to future generations.  It is partly 
this lack of commitment devices that, as noted earlier, has prompted some ecologists and 
ecological economists to advocate what has come to be known as “strong sustainability” 
criterion: requiring the stocks of natural capital to be kept intact or, at least, not exploited 
beyond certain threshold levels.  This may have some merit when, due to absence, or 
failure, of markets and other institutions, stocks of natural capitals are likely to be over-
depleted. However, resorting to such a crude means as a substitute for a more efficient 
commitment device may come at the cost of inflicting significant welfare losses on all 
generations.  The problem of lack of a commitment device for intergenerational transfer of 
optimality gains is likely to be particularly acute in developing countries where political 
and social institutions are too weak and governments are sometimes too corrupt to be 
trusted to act as the trustees and agents of such transfers.  This point underscores the 
fundamental role of fighting governmental corruption and institutionalizing grass-root 
stakeholders’ organizations. Unfortunately in many developing countries natural resource 
rents are the monopoly of corrupt and undemocratic governments.  In such cases, the 
welfare of both present and future generations may be better served by transferring the 
rights over natural assets from the government to people by distributing these assets 
equally to all citizens.   
(2)   Even though it is virtually impossible to adopt the policy of “zero-net-aggregate-
investment” at every point in time, it would still be a prudent policy to invest the rents from 
  21natural resource assets in other productive capital stocks. That is, the depreciation of 
natural capital stocks should be made up for by investing adequately both in natural and 
man-made capital stocks, and particularly in irreversible physical infrastructure, knowledge 
and human capital, and social capital. Unfortunately, as shown in Farzin (1999), for many 
of natural resource-based developing countries, the actual savings and investment rates 
have been far below the rates needed to ensure that the living standards of these countries 
would not decline over time. 
(3)  The policy of investing the resource rents in turns requires that all of the natural 
capital stocks which are used in production processes be accounted for and evaluated at 
correct (shadow) prices at any time point. In other words, greening of the income accounts 
at every level of economic activity is a fundamental step towards welfare growth and 
sustainability. For natural capital stocks particularly, this points to the vital roles of 
instituting and strengthening the property rights (whether private, communal, or public) 
over natural and environmental assets and enforcing these rights. 
(4)  A major step towards both optimality and sustainability is to internalize the 
externalities associated with utilization of natural and environmental resource stocks. One 
effective way of doing this is to price the use of these resources at their “full” marginal 
social costs (benefits) by levying charges and/or removing direct or indirect subsidies to 
avoid overexploitation of under-priced natural and environmental resources.  Besides 
correcting for the negative externalities associated with use of natural and environmental 
resources, there is another important reason for making sure that natural and environmental 
resources are not under priced. This has to do with two factors, both of which deriving 
from concerns about sustainability. The first factor is the fact that resource and 
environmental assets in themselves have stock values in addition to their use value from 
harvesting or extracting them for use as inputs to production processes. Resource and 
environmental  stock values could take the forms of amenities value, existence or intrinsic 
value, precautionary value, and the like. The second factor relates to the weight that a 
society places on the welfare of the distant future generations. In other words, it reflects the 
degree to which social preferences emphasize the welfare of distant future generations 
versus that of present generation, and ranges from the extreme of the conventional 
discounted utilitarian social welfare function, which completely ignores the far distant 
  22future generation, to the other extreme of the so called “green golden rule”, which neglects 
the present by seeking the maximum ultimately sustainable utility level. In between these 
extremes lies the so called Chichilnisky’s sustainability criterion which maximizes a social 
welfare function which is a weighted average of the discounted utilitarian welfare function 
and the green golden rule (see, Chichilnisky (1996) and Chichilnisky, Heal and Beltratti 
(1995)). As Heal (2000) shows, the appropriate shadow price of natural capital will be 
higher the more we recognize the environmental stock as a source of value and the more 
weight we give to the long-run future relative to the present.  On both grounds, concerns 
about sustainability translate into raising the shadow price of environmental resources.  
(5)  As discussed above, today in many developing countries the living standards are 
very low, so that expecting the current generations to save and invest at high rates for the 
sake of raising future generations’ welfare would be morally questionable.  On the other 
hand, using a high constant discount rate would compromise the principle of 
intergenerational fairness, as it ignores the welfare of distant future generations. However, 
one way out of this dilemma would be to use a non-constant discount rate: specifically, a 
discount rate profile that starts at a relatively high rate and then declines over time as the 
living standards of future generations increase.  Such a policy would more equitably 
allocate the savings burden across all generations while at the same time allows welfare to 
grow over time.  A policy of declining discount rate is also supported by a non-ethical 
argument; namely, today, as an economy plans, the outcomes of future technological 
changes become increasingly more uncertain as the planning horizon extends to more 
distant future, implying a declining certainty-equivalent rate of return on future investments 
(see, Weitzman (1999)).  
(6)  Finally, rather than sacrificing future generations’ welfare in pursuit of a 
puritanical moral principle of intergenerational justice, developing counties can more 
pragmatically pursue an optimal growth approach to increase future welfare levels but 
mitigate welfare inequalities directly by redistribution of wealth and income both 
intragenerationally and intergenerationally. Importantly, since sustainability 
considerations are meaningful when considered at macro scales, such redistribution of income and 
wealth should take place not only at the national level but regionally and globally as well.   
 
  235. Conclusion 
  If we consider sustainability a matter of intergenerational fairness, and draw from 
theoretical insights received from the literature on sustainability and optimal economic 
growth, we can answer a fundamental question: Can an optimal path of development be 
also sustainable?  We have argued that while the maximin rule of intergenerational equality 
may be an appropriate socio-economic goal for the rich industrial countries, for the 
developing countries with poor endowments of some of the critical capital assets, such as 
human capital, knowledge capital, and institutional capital, it is ethically questionable and 
practically daunting. It is ethically questionable because it subjects all future generations to 
the poverty of the present generation, and is impracticable because of its demand for 
information about existing capital stocks, their evolution over time, and the role of 
ecological assets in production and well-being.  Finally, the requirement to have well-
developed markets and non-market institutions seem unrealistic.  
  On the other hand, the utilitarian optimal growth approach, in its undiscounted-utility 
version, is capable of generating higher living standards for future generations but can 
result in considerable intergenerational inequality because it imposes an unacceptably high 
savings burden on the present generation (in its discounted-utility version, it eventually 
leads to an economic doomsday). For these reasons, it appears that the question should not 
be viewed as one of optimality versus intergenerational justice (sustainability); rather, as 
one of optimizing economic development while taking into account intragenerational and 
intergenerational fairness.  Thus, we have argued that a compromise policy that combines 
the best features of both paradigms offers a more suitable approach to promote the rising 
welfare and avoid unreasonable intergenerational inequality in developing countries. We 
have highlighted some of the main elements of such a policy. These include: (i) developing 
and empowering democratic political and social institutions so that the governments 
become accountable for reinvesting natural resources rents in reproductive capital assets 
(specially in human and knowledge capitals) and act as honest trustees for intergenerational 
transfers; (ii) instituting and strengthening the property rights over natural and 
environmental assets and enforcing the rights effectively; (iii) greening of the income 
accounts at micro and macroeconomic levels; (iv) pricing the use of natural and 
environmental resources at their full social opportunity costs, including the social values of 
  24their diverse services as environmental assets; (v) using discount rates that decline over 
time as future generations become more prosperous; (vi) mitigating welfare inequalities 
directly through income and wealth redistribution policies both at the national and 
international levels; and (vii), adopting an economy-wide, as opposed to sectoral, view of 
the scale of sustainability.   
Defined as material well-being or consumption per capita, the welfare concept 
underlying this analysis is narrow. A more general analysis of sustainability should also 
recognize the importance of non-material components of well-being, including social and 
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